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PHILOSOPHICAL IDENTITY AND THE QUEST FOR
PLANETARY THINKING
NORMAN SWAZO
FAIRBANKS, ALASKA

The true struggles of our time, the only ones which are significant, are struggles between humanity which has already collapsed
and humanity which still has roots but is struggling to keep them or
find new ones.
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences
What is needed is not the insistence that one see with his own
eyes, rather it is that he not explain away under the pressure of prejudice what has been seen.
Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy
Europe — whatever goes by that name today1 — has for the most
part always had a sense of philosophical identity. Indeed, for Europe its
essential identity cannot but be philosophical, though this may well be
said to be merely a prejudice of the "European" philosopher.
Presumably, however, there is more than mere prejudice here, as the
work of both Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger would have it.
Husserl and Heidegger both subscribed to this "prejudice" but justified
it philosophically.
Husserl sought to realize that philosophical identity through his
transcendental phenomenology. Heidegger sought not so much a continuation of that identity as a transformation of it, given his quest for
"planetary thinking." 2
For Husserl, Europe's appropriation of its genuine philosophical
task is essential to the advancement of humanity. For Heidegger, the
prospective participants in the practice of planetary thinking and planetary building are "by no means equal" to the "encounter," to the "possible conversation between them." For Husserl, the method of transcendental phenomenology enables a universal and infinite philosophical
project which Europe inaugurates and which leads inevitably beyond
the "limited cultural goals" of this and that civilization's
Weltanschauung. For Heidegger, neither the European nor the East
Asiatic languages is able, by itself, to open up and then establish the
area of planetary thinking.
It would seem, thus, that we are today on that "stretch of the road"
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in our history whereupon European and non-European alike are called
to a reflection upon the matter of philosophical identity and the quest for
planetary thinking. What follows is in the service of this reflection.

I. Husserl's "Discovery"
As is well known to students of recent European philosophy,
Edmund Husserl was one of a number of 20"' century philosophers concerned with assessing the "vital" status of European philosophy. This
concern, as expressed in Husserl's The Crisis of the European Sciences,
issues in the wake of the critical assessment of philosophy in Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason as well as the "countercurrents" to the mainstream of the Western tradition as articulated by Marx and Nietzsche.
Kant's critical assessment of the dogmatic excesses of speculative metaphysics and the epistemological threat of radical skepticism left open
the promise of philosophy as "rigorous science." The Marxist challenge
to Hegel's idealist conception of history as well as to the earlier
Enlightenment philosophy of optimism, followed by the Nietzschean
demotion of Platonic idealism, Aristotelian teleology, and Christian
eschatology, brought to the foreground the historical situation of "crisis" in which European philosophy still finds itself today.
A crisis is, of course, a moment of decision. For Husserl, we are
faced with a philosophical question in this moment of decision:
whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth
of Greek philosophy — that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is
only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from
latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through
this, its truth and genuine human nature — whether this telos, then, is
merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations and histories, or whether Greek
humanity was not rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to
humanity as such, its entelechy.3
We are, as Husserl asserted, in the midst of a "struggle", a "spiritual struggle." It is a struggle "for the meaning of a genuine humanity." 4
Europe, by the fate of its essential history, stands at the center of this
struggle.
The outcome of this struggle is linked inextricably to the movement
of modern philosophy, i.e., to that early modern project conceived as
"the form of a universal philosophy which grows through consistent
apodictic insight and supplies its own norms through an apodictic

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol50/iss50/5

2

Swazo: Philosophical Identity and the Quest for Planetary Thinking
Norman Swazo

49

method." 5 This was, of course, the "foundationalist" intent of Descartes'
philosophy as well as of the later 18th century rationalist enterprise.
Husserl acknowledged that this rationalist project was "naive," naive in
its concepts, in its problems, in its method, and in its goals. This naivete
was insisted upon consistently by the epistemological skeptic, of
course, which skeptical assault itself served to motivate the rationalist
quest to assure itself of theoretical results. Yet Husserl was not prepared
to "sacrifice the genuine sense of rationalism":
...as philosophers of the present we have fallen into a painful existential contradiction. The faith in the possibility of philosophy as a task,
that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge, is something we
cannot let go. We know that we are called to this task as serious
philosophers. And yet, how do we hold onto this belief, which has
meaning only in relation to the single goal which is common to us all,
that is, philosophy as such? 6

Why could Husserl — indeed, all European philosophers — not let
go of the quest for universal knowledge undertaken by philosophy conceived as rigorous science? They could not responsibly let go of this
quest because philosophy, properly carried out, comprehends more than
"merely private or otherwise limited cultural goals:"
In our philosophizing, then — how can we avoid it? — we are
functionaries of mankind. The quite personal responsibility of our own
true being as philosophers, our inner personal vocation, bears within
itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of mankind:
the latter is, necessarily, being toward a telos and can come to realization, if at all, through philosophy —through us, if we are philosophers
in all seriousness. 7
This is the "fate" of one who lives a "philosophical existence,"
even as Husserl did — to be a functionary of mankind, to engage thereby in the task of "spiritual legislation" for humanity through a universal
philosophy realizing its telos. Universal humanity, as well as European
humanity, is a "philosophical-historical idea." Such an idea, teleological through-and-through, heralds a fateful task yet to be undertaken and
fulfilled especially by those who are "European/Occidental/Western"
philosophers. Governed by, indeed immersed in, a teleology, they must
articulate "the true being of mankind," a "being" which transcends the
merely private and the limited cultural goals of this or that factual "civilization."
Significantly, whatever is articulated, legislated, for mankind at
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large emerges from what has hitherto been a "systematically selfenclosed cultural form," viz., philosophy. But, this "philosophy" has
always been the expression of a "movement of an advancing reconstruction," beginning with the Greek nation then proceeding in a way
such as to draw all humanity under its spell.8
As a movement of advancing reconstruction, European philosophy
knows itself through both a quest for universal validity and a sense of
infinite tasks. This quest for universal validity and this sense for infinite
tasks which aims to incorporate the limited cultural goals of "civilizations" raise the question about the status of that "thinking" which is
denominated "philosophy" but also given one or another "cultural"
qualifier — "Indian," "Chinese," "African," "Latin American," etc. The
question is at once factual and essential. That is, as even Husserl admitted, there is a plethora of works that are labeled "Indian philosophy",
"Chinese philosophy," etc. For all of these we can certainly seek to
identify and list common morphological features and so speak of
"merely different historical forms under one and the same idea of culture." But, this "factual" approach misses something "essential," says
Husserl: "...one must not allow the merely morphologically general features to hide the intentional depths so that one becomes blind to the
most essential differences of principle." 9
Indian, Chinese, African, Latin American etc., philosophies may
surely be said to be engaged with the question of a "universal knowledge of the world." But, claims Husserl, European philosophy — i.e.,
that which, as ongoing telos, begins as Greek philosophy qua arche of
an advancing movement of reconstruction — manifests its essential difference: "...only in the Greeks do we have a universal ("cosmological")
life-interest in the essentially new form of a purely 'theoretical' attitude...The theoretical attitude has its historical origin in the Greeks." 10
This theoretical attitude enables and inaugurates a critical task of
universal scope, giving to European philosophy its unique "praxis,"
viz.,
...that of the universal critique of all life and all life-goals, all cultural products and systems that have already arisen out of the life of man;
and thus it also becomes a critique of mankind itself and of the values
which guide it explicitly or implicitly. Further, it is a praxis whose aim
is to elevate mankind through universal scientific reason, according to
the norms of truth of all forms, to transform it from the bottom up into
a new humanity made capable of an absolute self-responsibility on
the basis of absolute theoretical insights."
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Clearly, on this line of argument, it makes no sense to conceive of
Indian, Chinese, African, Latin American, etc. "philosophies" as equivalent to European philosophy, despite their concern for knowledge
about the world. To European philosophy and to it alone can we assign
the theoretical attitude; to these other alleged "philosophies" we must
assign a different attitude, viz., the "religious-mythical attitude." This
distinction of attitude entails an evaluation of other civilizations thus:
It is understandable that this mythical-practical world-view and
world-knowledge can give rise to much knowledge of the factual
world, the word as known through scientific experience, that can later
be used scientifically. But within their own framework of meaning
this world-view and world-knowledge are and remain mythical and
practical, and it is a mistake, a falsification of their sense, for those
raised in the scientific ways of thinking created in Greece and developed in the modem period to speak of Indian and Chinese philosophy
and science (astronomy, mathematics), i.e., to interpret India,
Babylonia, China, in a European way. 12

Theoria, as Husserl conceives it, is an act of bracketing (epoche) of
all practical interests, an act which furthermore devolves upon a sustained distinction of doxa (opinion) and episteme (knowledge). Theory,
seeking what is beyond limited cultural goals, seeks a truth that is not
"tradition-bound," i.e., "an identical truth which is valid for all who are
no longer blinded by traditions, a truth-in-itself." Presumably, this is
what Aristotle, for example, had in mind when he said "all knowledge
is universal" (pasa episthmh twn kaqolou) and so, like Plato before Nan,
assigned the ancestral custom of Greek religion to the domain of myth
(muqoV) rather than to logic (lwgoV).
In this sense of universality, then, it is meaningful to speak of the
historical factuality of "cultural configurations" such as Europe, India,
China, etc., each with its respective manner of "communalization." But
the cultural configuration that is associated with the theoretical attitude
is to be distinguished from those configurations associated with the religious-mythical attitude. The former is essentially characterized by "the
peculiar universality of its critical stance," whereas the latter remains
within the ambit of limited cultural goals. Those who undertake the theoretical attitude are committed to the task of "subject[ing] all empirical
matters to ideal norms," the consequence of which is "a far-reaching
transformation of the whole praxis of human existence." 13
European philosophy, in contrast to Indian, Chinese, African, Latin
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American, etc., "philosophy," is prepared to question and challenge the
limited cultural goals of these products of the religious-mythical attitude and submit them to the episteme of a "universally transformed
praxis." Thus, "What is traditionally valid is either completely discarded, or its content is taken over philosophically and thereby formed anew
in the spirit of philosophical ideality.'" 4 Herein is the essential "supranationality" of European philosophy vis-a-vis other cultures and civilizations. Herein is "the spiritual shape" of a Europe which legislates
for humanity far more essentially than is manifest in international
"commerce and power struggles."
Husserl could not be more clear: "Within European civilization,
philosophy has constantly to exercise its function as one which is
archontic for the civilization as a whole." 15

II. Husserl's Challenge
With Husserl, we too may allow for the idea of philosophy as a
spiritual movement of infinite tasks. We may, therefore, along with
Husserl, distinguish between philosophy as this idea of infinite tasks
and philosophy as the historical actuality which at any given time
approximates to some degree this infinity in some totality of "truths," to
some of which we may even ascribe universal validity. Thereby we, too,
may seek some movement beyond the point of existential crisis, beyond
what may initially present itself as "an obscure fate, an impenetrable
destiny." The question that comes to the fore, however, is whether the
decision is properly to be taken with reference to "the teleology of
European history."
Today there are surely many answers circulating in response to the
question, "What is Europe?" Husserl, seeking to overcome the naive
rationalism of modem philosophy, yet pursue the quest of genuine
rationalism, had given what he construed to be a "philosophically discovered" answer to that question: "In order to be able to comprehend
the disarray of the present 'crisis,' we had to work out the concept of
Europe as the historical teleology of the infinite goals of reason..."'6
This answer situates the European philosopher in an existential assessment represented by a choice between two possibilities, which Husserl
articulated thus:
There are only two escapes from the crisis of European existence: the
downfall of Europe in its estrangement from its own rational sense of
life, its fall into hostility toward the spirit and into barbarity; or the
rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy through a heroism of
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reason that overcomes naturalism once and for all."

The first possibility, while clearly an historical possibility for
Europe, is of course inconsistent with the teleology of the European
spirit. So long as genuine philosophy is extant, the second possibility
remains and motivates all European philosophers who perceive and
accept their task as functionaries of mankind. Husserl, having assessed
the existential crisis of Europe, stands against "the generally reigning
opinion" that the dream of philosophy as rigorous science is over. He
believes himself "bound" to a goal, even as he would have all who
claim to be philosophers to be bound to the same goal.
What can bind us to our goal? Is it only the foolhardiness of striving toward a goal which is beautiful but only vaguely possible, one
which is not definitely impossible but still, in the end, imaginary, one
which gradually, after the experience of millennia, finally begins to bear
a very inductive probability of being unattainable? Or does what
appears from the outside to be a failure, and on the whole actually is
one, bring with it a certain evidence of practical possibility and necessity, as the evidence of an imperfect, one-sided, partial success, but still
a success in this failure? 18
To be sure, many will answer Husserl here by saying that European
philosophy has indeed been a foolhardiness, our empirical evaluation of
its historical course yielding the inductive conclusion that the goal is,
after all, unattainable. One may find oneself thereby converted from
being the rationalist in quest of apodicticity to the epistemological skeptic at best, given that the philosopher who yet practices is unwilling to
commit her/himself to that disciplinary suicide represented by epistemological nihilism.
Yet, perhaps Husserl is right to turn the question sideways, asking
as he does: "What autonomous thinker has ever been satisfied with this,
his 'knowledge?' For what autonomous thinker, in his philosophizing
life, has 'philosophy' ever ceased to be an enigma?'" 9 With these questions before us, what stand do we today take on the question of philosophy's "goal"? Do we, we who claim to philosophize today, abdicate
our philosophical enterprise, confess our naivete before the self-assured
epistemological skeptic, or do we instead take this enigma to be the
clarion call to an indispensable task for humanity?
Husserl's quest for rigorous science with a view to discovering universally valid truths in a process of inquiry having infinite tasks is
meaningful according to a conception of 'universality.' We should, of
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course, consider what this conception may involve as we consider
whether philosophers today indeed have an indispensable task such as
Husserl conceived it. Consider the following observations from the
German physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker:
Universality and certainty are traditionally considered to be concomitant terms. Kant defines a priori knowledge as both necessary and
universal; and necessity implies certainty. The concomitance of the
two terms might seem to be trivial. Whatever counts as universal
holds without exception and, in that sense, is certain; what is certain
holds wherever it is applied; i.e., it holds universally. 20

As yon Weizsacker himself notes, "this description of the terms'
meanings is too vague; it admits of an interpretation in which their interrelation is no longer so obvious." If one considers the relation between
the concept of universality and the concept of certainty one, of course,
ought not to expound that relation in a way that begs the question. But,
Weizsacker claims, this is precisely what happens.
To infer the certainty of a proposition from its universality is a case
of begging the question, since the certainty of its universal validity must
already be presupposed. Conversely, the universality of a proposition
does not follow from its certainty, if by certainty we mean that the
proposition is indubitably true, and by universality a logical form such
as 'All A are B.' There are propositions that hold only for particular
cases yet are certain, and propositions that are universal in form yet
doubtful. 21
Surely we can be agreed that von Weizsaicker provides us a needed clarification here, and one to which we can also readily assent. In
Aristotelian logic all locutions are potentially translatable into categorical propositions either universal or particular. Universality can, thus, be
affirmative or negative in quality. Presumably, then, any locution found
in any given philosophical sub-specialty (metaphysics, epistemology,
ethics, aesthetics, etc.) can have categorical form and we can, thereby,
have a collection of universal propositions. Thus we would recognize,
as von Weizsaicker says, that "A proposition holds universally in each
individual case and, in that sense, without exception."
Husserl, however, is clearly concerned not just with universality
but with apodicticity, thus with having propositions that are both certain
and necessary. But in this case Husserl would have us distinguish, as
Kant did before him, between that knowledge which is "empirical" and
that knowledge which is "pure" and thus consider what method of
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analysis yields each of these. Can one have "empirical knowledge"
which is universal and also both certain and necessary? Can one have
"pure knowledge" which is universal and also both certain and necessary?
Concerning the first question, of course, empirical knowledge is
usually said to be the result of inductive method, this method giving us
some universal generalizations and, at best, nomological statements that
have stronger validity than universal generalizations but perhaps cannot
claim apodicticity. Anyone familiar with Husserl's critique of the historicist attitude will readily realize that we must be careful about evaluating the prospect of philosophy as rigorous science by the measure of
"inductive probability." This measure is that of empirical knowledge,
specifically that of historiography.
If we conceive of philosophy as a "cultural formation," insofar as
cultural formations are "historical life forms," it follows that philosophy
is an historical life form that will "come and go in the stream of human
development." But herein is a conceptual failure and, thus, an epistemological mistake. If indeed philosophy is possible only as a cultural
formation, then philosophy will always be, in its methods and in its content, characterized by "contingent validity." As Husserl says, "There
would be no unqualified validity, or validity-in-itself, which is what it
is even if no one has achieved it and though no historical humanity will
ever achieve it."22 One very basic implication of this impossibility of
unqualified validity is that "there would then be no validity to the principle of contradiction nor to any logic." From this consequence those
engaged by the Western rationalist tradition inevitably recoil.

III. The "Transcendental" Assessment
This recoil should have the effect of returning us to our question
and to seeing in that question a problematic measure applied to philosophy, i.e., the measure of inductive probability. Husserl responds: "the
scientific decision regarding validity itself and regarding its ideal normative principles is in no way the affair of empirical science."23 If the
history of philosophy is undertaken as the historiography of this or that
cultural formation, undertaken thus as an empirical investigation that
yields only or merely inductive results, it cannot but give only contingently valid conclusions.
The very possibility of philosophy would be thus delimited by "historical science", historical science thereby having assumed a de facto
"archontic" status vis-a-vis philosophy. Yet, to be de facto archontic is
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not to be de jure archontic. Historical reasons, insofar as they are only
contingently valid propositions, "can advance nothing relevant against
the possibility of absolute validities in general." Hence, historical science "can advance nothing in particular against the possibility of an
absolute (i.e., scientific) metaphysics or any other philosophy. It can as
historical science in no way prove even the affirmation that up to the
present there has been no scientific philosophy." 24 Husserl states the
argument more fully thus:
The unconditional affirmation that any scientific philosophy is a chimaera, based on the argument that the alleged efforts of millennia
make possible the intrinsic impossibility of such a philosophy, is erroneous not merely because to draw a conclusion regarding an unlimited future from a few millennia of higher culture would not be a good
induction, but erroneous as an absolute absurdity, like 2 x 2 = 5. And
this is for the indicated reason: if there is something there whose
objective validity philosophical criticism can refute, then there is also
an area within which something can be grounded as objectively valid.
If problems have demonstrably been posed "awry", then it must be
possible to rectify this and pose straight problems. If criticism proves
that philosophy in its historical growth has operated with confused
concepts, has been guilty of mixed concepts and specious conclusions, then if one does not wish to fall into nonsense, that very fact
makes it undeniable that, ideally speaking, the concepts are capable of
being posited, clarified, distinguished, that in the given area correct
conclusions can be drawn. Any correct, profoundly penetrating criticism itself provides means for advancing and ideally points to correct
goals, thereby indicating an objectively valid science.25

Clearly, Husserl's argument does not permit the genuine philosopher's abdication before the empirical judgment of the historiographer
even and especially when that historian is a philosopher. S/he who
measures by way of inductive probability is governed by a concept of
finitude, by a concept of philosophy having spatiotemporally limited
validity. Husserl does not call these "philosophers" to the task of philosophy as rigorous science: "These men [and women] who set the goal in
the finite, who want to have their system and want it soon enough to be
able to live by it, are in no way called to this task."26
Those called to the task of philosophy as rigorous science pursue
knowledge that is universally valid but also, and more importantly, apodictically certain. In "Meditation Two" of his Cartesian
Meditations,
Husserl clarified his sense of apodicticity thus:
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Any evidence is a grasping of something in itself that is, or is thus, a
grasping ... with full certainty of its being, a certainty that accordingly excludes every doubt. But it does not follow that full certainty
excludes the conceivability that what is evident could subsequently
become doubtful, or the conceivability that being could prove to be an
illusion — indeed, sensuous experience furnishes us with cases where
that happens. Moreover, this open possibility of becoming doubtful,
or of non-being, in spite of evidence, can always be recognized in
advance by critical reflection on what the evidence in question does.
An apodictic evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the affairs
or affair-complexes (states of affairs) evident in it; rather it discloses
itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity of being

at the same time the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of
their non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as
"objectless", empty. Furthermore, the evidence of that critical reflection likewise has the dignity of being apodictic, as does therefore the
evidence of the unimaginableness of what is presented with [apodictically] evident certainty.27

Thus, in contrast to empirical knowledge with its contingent validity and, thus, inductive probability, apodictic knowledge is characterized by both indubitability in the moment of a truth-claim and absolute
inconceivability of the non-being of that state of affairs represented by
the truth-claim. With this clarification in hand, we can now consider the
previously posed question: Can one have pure knowledge which is universal, but also both certain and necessary?
The answer to this question will be in the affirmative if one allows
the validity of the phenomenological epoche in its effort to know the
"ideal" in a way that transcends the limitations on knowing imposed by
the naturalistic attitude with its emphasis on experience related to spatiotemporal being. Husserl's phenomenological project holds out to us
the promise of "eidetic intuition" not limited by the methods and results
of "natural cognition" which "begins with experience and remains within experience". It would go beyond the purpose of this essay to demonstrate the validity of Husserl's project; he has accomplished this himself
quite adequately. His well-known work, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy, is the clear and
authoritative extended argument of his project.28 I take note here,
briefly, of some relevant statements from this work of Husserl in passing to the question of philosophy as rigorous science as it relates to the
quest for planetary thinking.
Given that natural cognition concerns "matters of fact" which yield
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only contingently valid propositions, there is no "necessity" to be found
by way of empirical knowing. Yet we have access to both an "eidetic
universality" and an "eidetic necessity" if we grant (with Husserl) that
"it belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and
therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely,' and this Eidos
comes under eidetic truths belonging to different levels of universality."29 Philosophy itself may be engaged by way of experience and thus
in the way the historiographer of philosophy does so and thereby
ascribes to it and to its historical forms contingent validity and the
inductive improbability of it achieving the status of a rigorous science.
But precisely so long as we can experience philosophy as a matter
of fact we may also engage philosophy by way of its "essence," its
"Eidos," in short, come to know philosophy "eidetically" and not merely empirically. That philosophy which we encounter as what is current
(thus by way of "perception") or as something past (thus by way of
"memory") is given not merely in such "experiential data" but also by
way of a "pure essence" exemplified by these experiential data.
Approaching the phenomenon "philosophy" eidetically allows us to
arrive at eidetic, rather than merely empirical, results about this "matter
of fact."
With this latter distinction we can speak of an originary presentation of philosophy and thereby of the task of "eidetic seeing" which we
must undertake if we are to apprehend the possibility of philosophy as
rigorous science. Here we engage philosophy itself not merely by way
of empirical experience but by way of transcendental experience.
Transcendental experience is that "experience" which "confines
itself to the realm of pure possibility (pure imaginableness) and, instead
of judging about actualities of transcendental being, judges about [its] a
priori possibilities and thus at the same time prescribes rules a priori for
actualities."30
In short, a transcendental assessment of philosophy (a) judges the
a priori possibilities of philosophy and at the same time (b) prescribes
roles a priori for philosophy in its "actuality" or "actualities." It does
this by engaging philosophy proper as itself the eidetic evidence of the
transcendental ego: "we are envisaging a science that is, so to speak,
absolutely subjective, whose thematic object exists whether or not the
world exists. But more than this. Apparently my (the philosopher's)
transcendental ego is, and must be, not only its initial but its sole
theme.31 But, of course, as Husserl went on to show, this pure egology
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or phenomenological egology leads, "in the consequential elaboration
of this science," to a transcendental intersubjectivity and then to a universal transcendental philosophy.
In contrast to both naive rationalism and naturalism, transcendental
reflection attains to an "absolute freedom from prejudice" — freedom
from all uncritical assumptions in the Cartesian sense, of course, but
more importantly, freedom from the prejudices of the natural attitude.
"The universality of transcendental experience and description does
this," says Husserl, "by inhibiting the universal 'prejudice' of worldexperience, which hiddenly pervades all naturalness (the belief in the
world, which pervades naturalness thoroughly and continuously), and
then - within the sphere that remains unaffected, the absolute sphere of
egological being, as the sphere of meanings reduced to an unalloyed
freedom from prejudice — striving for a universal description. This
description is then called on to be the foundation for a radical and universal criticism." 32
Presumably, then, to the extent that Husserl makes his claims concerning "Europe," i.e., Europe as "the historical teleology of the infinite
goals of reason," he does so via a transcendental reflection which sustains throughout that reflection a fidelity to an immanent seeing. If he is
right in his philosophically discovered description of "Europe," this
reflection is "free from all interpretations" that read into the phenomenon "more than is genuinely seen." His immanent seeing of telos is thus
a seeing of not merely that which is actual qua European culture,
European thinking and doing, etc. It is a seeing that engages "an intentional horizon of reference" which includes that which is anticipated.
Thus, this horizon is already an opening for further disclosure. This
anticipatory analysis "uncovers" potentialities even as it engages factuality. Philosophy taken itself as a phenomenon of intentional analysis
always presents itself in a horizon of disclosure and so points or
"intends" beyond itself in its given factuality.
Keeping the foregoing in mind, we can then consider that Husserl's
references to "European humanity" are part and parcel of "humanity"
conceived as a constituted intermonadic community. "World" is, as
Husserl says in the "Fifth Meditation" of his Cartesian
Meditations,
"given to me and to everyone only as a cultural world and as having the
sense: accessible to everyone." This would be true of the European, the
Chinese, the African, the Indian, the Latin American, etc. Thus, "Each
man understands first of all, in respect of a core and as having its unre-
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vealed horizon, his concrete surrounding world or his culture; and he
does so precisely as a man who belongs to the community fashioning it
historically." 33 The possessive pronouns in this locution are not to go
unnoticed. A cultural world indeed has the sense "accessible to everyone;" but, "this accessibility," says Husserl, "is not unconditional:"
Everyone, as a matter of a priori necessity, lives in the same Nature,
a Nature moreover that, with the necessary communalization of his
life and the lives of others, he has fashioned into a cultural world in
his individual and communalized living and doing — a world having
human significances, even if it belongs to an extremely low cultural
level. But this, after all, does not exclude, either a priori or de facto,
the truth that men belonging to one and the same world live in a loose
cultural community — or even none at all — and accordingly constitute different surrounding worlds of culture, as concrete life-worlds in
which the relatively or absolutely separate communities live their passive and active lives. Each understands first of all, in respect of a core
and as having its unrevealed horizon, his concrete surrounding world
or his culture; and he does so precisely as a man who belongs to the
community fashioning it historically. A deeper understanding, one
that opens up the horizon of the past (which is co-determinant for an
understanding of the present itself), is essentially possible to all members of that community, with a certain originality possible to them
alone and barred to anyone from another community who enters into
relation with theirs.34

Clearly, then, insofar as a cultural world has "a core" which intends
at the same time an "unrevealed horizon," Europe, China, India, Africa,
Latin America, etc., would, prima facie at least, have a cultural world so
constituted. The "deep understanding" of that cultural world is restricted to the members of that world — each member has access to an originality from which the other of another culture is barred. Thus, the
Chinese, Indian, African, Latin American, etc., lacks access to that originality which inspires the constitution of "European humanity", even as
the European is barred from that which originally constitutes Chinese
humanity, Indian humanity, African humanity, Latin American humanity, etc. It follows from this intentional analysis of world constitution that
only Europeans can truly apprehend Europe as the historical teleology
of the infinite goals of reason — if, indeed, this expression captures the
"core" of European culture.
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IV. Universalists, Culturalists, Criticalists
The crisis of European sciences (and, thus, the crisis of European
humanity) has its consequences for "philosophical identity" in the postcolonial world of Africa and Latin America in particular. Contemporary
world order discourse thus finds itself having to engage issues of "culture and ideology in the modem world" by attending to both the "historical and philosophical problematic." 35 As R.B.J. Walker has observed,
"The long-entrenched claims to universality made by Western sociopolitical theory and philosophy appear to be increasingly vulnerable both
on their own terms and on those of other civilizational traditions that are
able to assert themselves in the modem world."36
The "hegemony of Western reason" with its claims to universal
truth is faced with a discourse of dissent, this dissent seeking to remedy
the global socioeconomic stratification that this hegemony has both produced and sustained. This dissent occurs not only by way of explicit
sociopolitical engagement, but also by way of asserting some sense of
philosophical identity.
In both cases of "Hispanic American philosophy" and "African philosophy" we find an on-going debate among their proponents as they
wrestle with the task of identifying what some would like to characterize as a philosophy "independent" of, yet "equivalent" to, European
philosophy. Some of these thinkers advance the cause of philosophy in
its universalist content and method, thus linking themselves to the
Western philosophical enterprise. Others, concerned to articulate a philosophy of liberation, advance the cause of culturalism, seeking to give
voice to a philosophy rooted in the concrete circumstances of their particular cultural world. Still a third group, the criticalists, seeks a middle
way between the universalists and culturalists, recognizing the legitimate claims and aspirations of each of the other two groups. According
to the universalist view, as Jorge J.E. Gracia remarks:
Philosophy, like mathematics and other disciplines of human knowledge, consists of a series of troths and methods of inquiry that have
no spatiotemporal characteristics. Its application and validity are universal and therefore independent of the historical conditions in which
they are discovered...Consequently, the answer to the question of
whether there is a Latin American philosophy is, from this perspective, negative. Furthermore, this view not only denies that there is a
Latin American philosophy, but it also rejects that there could be one,
for it sees an intrinsic incompatibility between the nature of philosophy as a universal discipline of learning and such particular products
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of culture."

In contrast to the universalist argument, the culturalist position as
advanced by the Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea holds that the
practice of philosophy is "a function of culture."38 If there is something
that we call "Latin American culture," then there may be a specifically
"Latin American philosophy." Zea thus engages the question of the status of Latin American culture relative to European culture, and notes
that the latter "has been shaken (or is in crisis) today." This is problematic for the Latin American who for a time has "lived comfortably under
the shadow of European culture." Indeed, says Zea, the crisis of
European culture is experienced by the Latin American as his own cri-

Zea writes:
The Latin American man who had lived so comfortably found that the
culture that supported him fails him, that he has no future, and that the
ideas in which he believed have become useless artifacts, without
sense, lacking value even for their own authors. The man who had
lived with so much confidence under a tree he had not planted now
finds himself in the open when the planter cuts down the tree and
throws it into the fire as useless. The man now has to plant his own
cultural tree, create his own ideas. But a culture does not emerge
miraculously; the seed of that culture must be taken from somewhere,
it must belong to someone. Now — and this is the issue that concerns
the Latin American man — where is he going to find that seed? That
is, what ideas is he going to develop? To what ideas is he going to
give his faith? Will he continue to believe and develop the ideas inherited from Europe? Or is there a group of ideas and issues to be developed that are proper to the Latin American circumstance? Or rather,
will he have to invent those ideas? 3 '

For Zea, the possibility of a genuinely Latin American philosophy
is tied to the question of whether the Latin American can "realize his
own personality," but do so "without having to deny the culture of
which we are children." The metaphor Zea employs here is significant.
The Latin American, having been raised in the shadow of Europe, has
felt himself "inferior," "illegitimate," a "bastard" child of the colonial
parents. But, in the midst of Europe's crisis, the Latin American "has
'come of age," and, having attained to his maturity "knows himself to
be the heir of Western culture and now demands a place in it."
The place that he demands is that of collaborator. As a son of that
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culture he no longer wants to live off it but to work for it. Alfonso
Reyes, speaking on behalf of a Latin America that feels responsible,
demanded from Europe "the right of universal citizenship that we have
already conquered," because already "we have come of age." Latin
America is at a point in its history when it must realize its cultural mission.40
The Peruvian-born philosopher Augusto Salazar Bondy, in contrast
to Zea, takes a criticalist view, acknowledging that what goes for
Hispanic philosophy in Latin America is nothing original and simply
imitative of European philosophy.41 For Bondy, Latin American philosophy would be a creation of Hispanic America only on the condition
that it "reflects the conscience of a community finding in it profound
resonance especially through its ethical and political derivations."
Influenced by the phenomenology of Heidegger, Bondy thus distinguishes between an "authentic" and "unauthentic" philosophy, and
seeks that which is "original" Hispanic philosophical writing rather than
that which is merely "plagiarist" of European concepts and categories.
As he says, "A defective and illusory philosophic conscience causes one
to suspect the existence of a defective and unauthentic social being, the
lack of a culture in the strong and proper sense of the term...This is the
case in Hispanic America." 42 Latin America, in short, suffers from a
problem of inauthenticity, and this due to it yet seeking its way beyond
the dependency associated with cultural domination.
Taking up Heideggerian concepts, Bondy believes it possible for
Hispanic American philosophy to find its authentic voicing. This entails
a meditation about Hispanic America's "anthropological status," and
thus, "the discovery and expression of...[its] own anthropological
essence." In this sense, Bondy's call for an authentic Hispanic American
philosophy that discovers and expresses a Latin American "anthropological essence" resonates with the phenomenological views of Husserl.
This concern for discovery of an anthropological essence is not
limited to Latin American thinkers. Neither is the dialectical engagement of universalists and culturalists, as we can see in contemporary
African scholarship. Paulin Hountondji is a representative of the former
group, Kwasi Wiredu representative of the other.
Here, too, we find concern for the question of "African identity,"
the question being whether this can be done without being already
steeped in certain presuppositions as to method and concepts that are
alien to African culture. Hountondji reminds us that colonization had its
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imperial designs, motivated by an agenda to "civilize" a "primitive
mentality," and thus sanctioned cultural asymmetry and socioeconomic
dependency. Modern European philosophy in one way or another presented itself such that either the European mind was (a) conceived to be
"radically disparate" from that of the African or (b) there was an "evolutionary connection" between the two, but with the European mind at
the summit of the human scale.
These philosophical positions called forth various African apologies in the form of theories of negritude (e.g., that of Leopold Sedar
Senghor) as part of a movement which Hountondji calls "ethnophilosophy," i.e., "ethnological work with philosophical pretensions." 43 Says
Hountondji, "Until now African philosophy has been little more than an
ethnophilosophy, the imaginary search for an immutable, collective philosophy, common to all Africans, although in an unconscious form." By
denominating such African writing "ethnophilosophy," Hountondji
makes it clear that there are no genuine philosophical "sources," only
oral literature —"proverbs, tales, dynastic poems," etc. — with the consequence that ethnophilosophy is "the prisoner of an ideological myth."
Hountondji counters the validity of ethnophilosophy by arguing
that "philosophy...is a specific theoretical discipline with its own exigencies and methodological rules."44 If there is to be a genuine African
philosophy, it is something future, not something past. For Hountondji
"What is in question...is the universality of the word 'philosophy'
throughout its possible geographical applications." He says:
My own view is that this universality must be preserved — not
because philosophy must necessarily develop the same themes or
even the same questions from one country or continent to another, but
because these differences of content are meaningful precisely and
only as differences of content, which, as such, refer back to the essential unity of a single discipline, of a single style of inquiry.45

Taking up a parallel to the Kantian project relative to both dogmatism and skepticism, Hountondji would put African philosophy on the
sure path of a theoretical discipline, in short, a science. Noting that
"Philosophical revolutions are functions of scientific revolutions",
Hountondji argues:
[l]f the development of philosophy is in some way a function of the
development of the sciences, then African philosophy cannot be separated from African science and we shall never have, in Africa, a philosophy in the strict sense, a philosophy articulated as an endless
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search, until we have produced, in Africa, a history of science, a history of the sciences. Philosophical practice, that peculiar form of theoretical practice that is called philosophy, is inseparable from that
other form of theoretical practice called science.46

By conceiving philosophical practice in its essential connection to
science, Hountondji would have African philosophy essentially connected to European philosophy and science. Genuine liberation will not
occur by pitting African culture against the European. Rather, it must
take up European science and technology and so put to work "the
European concept of philosophy that goes hand in hand with this science and technology and by developing free and critical thinking on the
subject of...[African] present realities."47 Thus, here too Husserl's postKantian quest for scientific philosophy resonates.
Kwasi Wiredu, conscious of the "conceptual soul-searching" obligatory for African philosophers trained in the Western tradition, is concerned about what be calls a "colonial mentality", i.e., a "mind-set" that
is "a by-product of an educational situation deriving historically from
the accident of colonization." 48 For Wiredu it is incumbent upon African
philosophers to liberate themselves from this mentality, to "decolonize"
their thinking by "test[ing] philosophical formulations in a metropolitan
language" in the vernacular "to see if they will survive independent
analysis." Where such testing is successful, a "spurious universal" will
be unmasked. The point, however, is not to surrender or abandon the
claimed validity of the universal. As Wiredu says, "A philosophical concept or problem, failing of universality through transcultural dissipation, need not be spurious on that account. It may be a matter of genuine
philosophical interest in its own linguistic home." 49
Wiredu's call for "conceptual decolonization" entails two complementary tasks:
On the negative side, I mean avoiding or reversing through a critical
conceptual self-awareness the unexamined assimilation in our
thought (that is, in the thought of contemporary African philosophers)
of the conceptual frameworks embedded in the foreign philosophical
traditions that have had an impact on African life and thought. And,
on the positive side, I mean exploiting as much as is judicious the
resources of our own indigenous conceptual schemes in our philosophical meditations on even the most technical problem of contemporary philosophy. 50

In this way, Wiredu hopes to engender substantive contributions on
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the question of "African identity." Contemporary African philosophy
has to speak to the African by way of the continent's "multifarious vernaculars." To the extent that this is accomplished, the contemporary
African avoids both cultural traditionalism and ethnic submission to
Western values, as the Nigerian philosopher Olusegun Oladipo put it.51
More important, as the South African philosopher W.L. van der Merwe
remarks, the task is not to decide between universalism and particularism. Rather, "the quest for a distinctive African philosophy is surpassed
by the multicultural contexts of present-day societies in Africa," the
implication being that African philosophy "exemplifies in a paradigmatic way the historical and cultural contingency, the contextual particularity, of philosophy." 52

V. Philosophy's Caesura
The debate among universalists, culturalists, and criticalists illustrates the problematic of philosophical identity in the "North-South"
dialogue. Europe itself, however, is not without its own ambiguous
place in this debate, which fact is made clear by contemporary Jewish
philosophy. Emil Fackenheim, a contemporary Jewish philosopher, is
correct in claiming that there is a medieval Jewish philosophy
(Philosophia Yehudit) represented by such as Moses Maimonides and a
modern Jewish philosophy represented by such as Moses Mendelsohn
and such more recent figures as Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber.
Notable, however, is Fackenheim's claim that the Holocaust, the
Nazi genocide of European Jews, is a f u n d a m e n t a l rupture not only for
Jewish philosophy but for the whole of Western philosophy itself.53 This
rupture brings to the fore two quarrels: (1) on the one hand, that
between the ancients and the moderns, wherein the disputation places
before us a choice between classical rationalism and modem subjectivism, and (2) on the other hand, that between Athens and Jerusalem,
wherein the disputation places before us a choice between an ostensibly
universalist reason and an ostensibly particularist faith, both of which
are rendered suspect by the Holocaust.
Husserl, himself a Jew, writing during the rise of the Third Reich
but prior to the horror of "Auschwitz", advanced the cause of universalist reason, championed the phenomenological method and the place of
transcendental experience, and sought a way beyond the crisis of
Europe by taking up the responsibility assigned to him by the telos!entelechy of European philosophy. Leo Strauss, also a Jew, sided with the
ancients in the quarrel with the modems, faulted the modem philosoph-
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ical project of Machiavelli and Hobbes, and sought to restore the place
of Plato and Aristotle in clarifying the relation between the modem
"city" and "man." 54
For Husserl, the crisis of European science yet allows for the
prospect of philosophy as rigorous science. For Strauss, the events of
world war and Nazi genocide yet allow for a recovery of the
philosophia perennis. For Heidegger, who agreed with Husserl on the
essential status of European philosophy, the completion of Western
metaphysics signals the disclosure of a new beginning, not as a continuation of philosophia but as an originary thinking (anfangliche
Denken).
In each case, "crisis" is a point in the history of the Occident in
which decision (Entscheidung) is yet possible. In each case, however,
"crisis" is not the equivalent of fundamental rupture or caesura such as
Fackenheim conceives it. To appropriate the concept of rupture is to
concede — at least tentatively — a fundamental failure of the
philosophia perennis as well as an impotence of a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and a Heideggerian originary thinking.
It is at this point of concession that I must pose a question that
essentially (wesentliche) counters and displaces the Husserlian "discovery" of Europe's telos/entelechy. Is Western reason fundamentally a history of an error, such that European humanity, far from being the
telos/entelechy of humanity, is the arche of a deformation of essence?55
With this question, I, following Derida, conceive the image of
Europe as a Janus head, one face brilliant with the lumen naturale of
the animal rationale-, the other face monstrous with the madness of reason's own interior deformity. Having said this, I recall (as does
Fackenheim) that Socrates alluded to the same possibility when he
decidedly took up the problems of philosophical anthropology rather
than cosmology: He had to determine whether he was a monster, and
thereby he uttered the primordial and ultimate question of Western
philosophical identity (see Plato, Phaedrus, 230A) that remains with us
through today.
The question I pose, therefore, unavoidably calls the Latin
American and the African philosophers to account for the manner in
which they both relate to and/or appropriate the European philosophical
project. This question that I pose also calls the Jewish philosophers to
account, calls Fackenheim in particular to account precisely because he,
quite seriously, would yet have European political philosophy con-
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tribute to a resolution of the status of the modem State of Israel.56 This
turn to European political philosophy is suspect given that political philosophy is a metaphusica specialis either derivative of or structurally
dependent on European philosophy qua "first philosophy" (prote
philosophia). If there is a rupture in first philosophy, so is there at the
same time a rupture of political philosophy.
To pose the question as I pose it above and to fathom it is to suspend oneself above the abyss of philosophy's rupture. Thus suspended,
surveying this Abgrund, as it were, one may reach out not to Athens but
rather to Jerusalem as the other point of origin that laid claim to us out
of antiquity. This origin claims us not by the symbol of a Delphic oracle with its admonition Gnothi sauton ("know thyself'), though this
symbol yet speaks to the German and the non-German alike in the context of a contemporary discourse on tragedy.57 No, this origin speaks to
us by way of song — that is, by way of psalm — rather than by way of
the proposition per se. I say "song" in the sense that "to become a song
would indicate a text's being learned by heart, its ever increasing familiarity, and yet the possibility of its being gone over daily without the
boredom of repetition." 58 Thus did King David write (Ps. 119:54), "Thy
precepts are to me as songs."
The contemporary Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas observes
that "The essence of great texts is not to arise outside history but to have
a meaning beyond the situation which has evoked them."59 This surely
would be said of the philosophia perennis which bespeaks the universalist quest of Western reason. But could it be said — indeed must it not
be said — of that which heralds from the origin that is Jerusalem, from
its "great texts," from its Torah and its Talmudl If the period 1933-1945
constitutes a time of rupture for the philosophia perennis, then perhaps
that breach is to be healed by that which the other origin yet bequeaths
to us if only we would be receptive to it.
Fackenheim reminds us that "What speaks through the past texts
may be the word of man. But it may also be a reality-higher-thanhuman; and, in that case, it must a fortiori be possible that the texts in
question are inexhaustible. For Heidegger, through great works of
Western philosophy speaks nothing less than Being itself. One cannot
be open to this possibility on behalf of Athens without also being open
to a higher-than-human speech coming from Jerusalem.. ."6C What word
speaks from Jerusalem? It is the word that speaks of a world in need of
tikkun, of healing the breach, of mending the world - tikkun haolam.
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After the Holocaust, both Jew and Gentile must face the old question of
the Western philosophia perennis - why is there anything at all rather
than nothing? But the question is now no longer metaphysical in the
classical sense of that term. It is, perhaps, an acutely historical question
given the ruptures of this past century, and thus it elicits our reflection
upon the possibility of a "higher-than-human speech." It is this reflection that enables and insists upon our contemporary interrogative
stance.
The Jewish philosopher Martin Buber would have us ask not
whether belief in God is still possible after the Holocaust but whether
we can still speak to him. In asking this question - why is there anything
at all rather than nothing? - we may yet speak to God and await that
response which is the evidence of a higher-than-human speech from
Jerusalem.
To pose this question is to ask, as Holocaust survivor Jean Amery
has asked, whether we can yet again have trust in the world. That is,
whether we can yet have trust in the other who presents him/herself as
human, but also whether we can yet have trust in that God who is said
to be compassionate and merciful and, so, salvific of human souls. To
have trust in the world is to have "certainty that by reason of written or
unwritten social contracts the other person will spare me - more precisely stated, that he will respect my physical, and with it also my metaphysical, being." 61
As important as is Amery's question about our trust in the other, the
question is better turned towards each one of us. And here, Jerusalem
speaks even as Levinas understands in taking up a Talmudic tractate and
sharing his reading of it with us. Citing the Mishna and Gemara passages from the tractate, Baba Metsia (83a-83b), Levinas points a way so I submit - to regaining trust in the world and in God. In this Talmudic
text, it is written that the son of a rabbi hires workers for his father. The
operative principle initially seems to be that "everything goes according
to the custom of the place." The son, we are told, "included food among
the condition" of the hire. The father's response is central to my point.
Let us consider the relevant passage from the Mishna as Levinas cites
it:
One day, Rabbi Johanan ben Mathia said to his son: Go hire some
workers. The son included food among the conditions. When he came
back, the father said: My son, even if you prepared a meal for them
equal to the one King Solomon served, you would not have fulfilled
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your obligation toward them, for they are the descendents of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.62

What is important here, as Levinas tells us, is that "from the
start.. .the Mishna affirms the rights of the other person, even if this person finds himself in the inferior position, which is dangerous to his freedom, of a worker for hire." One could say that the rights of the other
person are established by custom, and so the worker is hired "according
to the custom of the place." In this way we acknowledge the prima
facie, albeit limited, validity of custom wherever and whenever it is
encountered by us. But there is more here that is essential not just to
economic exchange but also to an essential moral comportment that
ought to obtain between humans. Levinas points for us: "Let us underline one more detail of the context in which the Mishna places itself,
which is typical of Jewish humanism: the man whose rights must be
defended is in the first place the other man; it is not initially myself." 63
In this comportment towards the other we find reason to view
him/her according to a status that transcends custom and reminds us of
the other's inalienable relation to us owing to an ancestral heritage in
which he or she shares. This ancestral heritage Levinas denominates "an
infinite right," but the emphasis is not on "right" but rather on "infinite,"
since Talmudic jurisprudence emphasizes "duty."64 As the father said to
his son, the obligation to the hired workers would not be fulfilled even
if the son were to prepare a meal equal to the one King Solomon prepared. Why not? The obligation derives from the fact that these hired
workers are descendents of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But, let us be
cautious in our reading here. Levinas rightly shifts our focus from ethnic descent as such to "the general principle in the idea enunciated in
the Talmudic passage":
...Israel means a people who has received the Law and, as a result, a
human nature which has reached the fullness of its responsibilities
and its self-consciousness. The descendents of Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob are human beings who are no longer childlike. Before a selfconscious humanity, no longer in need of being educated, our duties
are limitless.65

To encounter a descendent of Abraham is simultaneously to
encounter our limitless duty in the presence of the other. And, lest we
forget, precisely now that we must remember: "the heirs of Abraham are
of all nations: any man truly man is no doubt of the line of Abraham."1*
Accordingly, in keeping with the principle articulated in Kidushin (71a),
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to the other we concede the benefit of any doubt we may have concerning his/her legitimate status as an heir of Abraham.
It is with this proposition — that any man truly man is no doubt of
the line of Abraham — that today we may begin a genuinely planetary
thinking and acknowledge in "the other" his/her truly human identity. In
this proposition, I submit, we have an imperative of humanity which
ever transcends "the limited cultural goals" of a people such as Husserl
conceived them relative to this or that civilization's Weltanschauung.
Like Abraham before us, we too must be prepared to leave the land and
ways of our father's house and seek a new life and new understanding. 67
In making this journey towards the other, we make a movement beyond
the limited cultural goals of our own place and time in the direction of
the universal. But, as Levinas clarifies, here the conception is otherwise.
For Levinas, Israel is "a formation and expression of the universal; but
of the universal insofar as it unites persons without reducing them to an
abstraction in which their singularity of unique beings is sacrificed to
the genus; universality in which uniqueness has already been
approached in love."68
It is with reference to this limitless duty to the other, then, to the
truly human being who stands before us even at the far corners of the
Earth, that we can appropriate our task of tikkun haolam, mending the
world ruptured in this century. Jerusalem, too, offers us an appeal that
claims universal validity. It may be that if there is a telos/entelechy for
humanity, it is to be found not in the origin which is Athens, but in the
other origin that is Jerusalem. In this origin we find not the philosophia
perennis, not philosophy as rigorous science, not the originary thinking
attuned to Being's unconcealment, but the simple word of a psalm, the
simple word of a prayer, and the simple word of a proverb. Herein is to
be found not the sophia of the Greeks but something akin to it, called
chokmah, "wisdom" if you will. This wisdom teaches a universal duty
that lays claim to an infinite right and so admonishes us against transgression of the other. As Levinas says in yet another Talmudic reading,
this time in reference to a biblical text (2 Sam. 21): "In Israel, princes
die a horrible death because strangers were injured by the sovereign." 69
King David does not refuse the Gibeonites their "cruel justice". But the
lesson, the Talmudic wisdom, by which we should be instructed even
today, is this: "The Talmud teaches that one cannot force men who
demand retaliatory justice to grant forgiveness. It teaches us that Israel
does not deny this imprescriptable right to others. But it teaches us
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above all that if Israel recognizes this right, it does not ask it for itself
and that to be Israel is to not claim it." 70
As we consider the problem of philosophical identity today in its
relation to the quest for planetary thinking, we have every reason to
appropriate the legacy of Jerusalem. 71 Contemporary Jewish philosophy
offers itself in the service of tikkun haolam. Levinas is, from one perspective, the apt "Jewish philosopher" of today. Fully versed in the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, yet also
competent in the Jewish tradition of Talmudic scholarship, Levinas contributes a "phenomenology of the other" and thus provides us with one
means of bridging the fundamental rupture of Western philosophy.72
Both through his Talmudic readings and his phenomenology of the
other, Levinas offers us an instruction that, were we to appropriate it,
may yet help to heal the breach. As John Wild remarked in his
"Introduction" to Levinas's Totality and Infinity, "Responsible communication [between the other and myself] depends on an initial act of generosity, a giving of my world to him with all its dubious assumptions
and arbitrary features. They are then exposed to the questions of the
other, and an escape from egotism becomes possible." 73 One must take
care here, however, to bear in mind that this escape from egotism is
never a totalizing comprehension of the other. As Levinas himself says,
the other most truly presents him/herself kath auto: "Manifestation kath
auto consists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regard, expressing itself."'"
If we learn from Levinas, then, a genuinely planetary thinking, in
which traditions of thought encounter each other, we will emerge with
a productive efficacy when we acknowledge at the outset of the
encounter that, "The other is not an object that must be interpreted and
illumined by my alien thought. He shines forth with his own light, and
speaks for himself." 75 It is important, therefore, that we always be open
to the challenge that the encounter with the other poses for our egotism.
Justice in this encounter "involves obligations with regard to an existent
that refuses to give itself, the Other..."76
Properly to engage the other is to endure this refusal by avoiding
those reductive maneuvers which then conceive the other as a "generality" and so do violence to the other in his/her refusal. Generality that
then presents itself as an anonymous universality is, as Levinas says, in
that maneuver already an "inhumanity" to the other. If we would be
"moral" in relation to the other, we need bear in mind always that
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"Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself,
feels itself to be arbitrary and violent."77 And, if we would invoke "reason" in our encounter of the other, then let us understand further that
"The essence of reason consists not in securing for man a foundation
and powers, but in calling him in question and in inviting him to justice."78
Accordingly, the European philosopher must consider first and
foremost that even as his/her language is already a polemos, even more
so is there violence in Husserl's "discovery" of "the teleology of
European history." Derrida, I think correctly, observed that herein is an
unwitting metaphysical racism.79 Precisely here, where the essence of
Western reason is advanced as a covert metaphysical racism, must we
call ourselves into question and invite ourselves to justice. To call ourselves into question is to heed the call to peace as "a call more urgent
than that of truth," as Levinas says.80 In this peace "it is not a matter of
peace as pure rest that confirms one's identity but of always placing in
question this very identity."
To accept this invitation in the "epiphany" of the other is to concede forthwith that already, in that very epiphany, is attested "the presence of...the whole of humanity, in the eyes that look at me."81
Challenging the philosophical basis of the modem state, Levinas therefore properly asks whether its founding and preserving "proceeds from
a war of all against all — or from the irreducible responsibility of the
one for the other. It is not without importance to know this so that war
does not become the institution of a war with a good conscience in the
name of historical necessities." 82 The sages representing the wisdom of
Jerusalem understood the full claim of the other's epiphany when they
taught, in the Talmudic tractate Sanhedrin, that
...any man who has saved a Jewish soul, it is as if he had saved a
whole world. But here, too, let us apprehend the principle that goes
beyond the literal reference to ethnicity. To save a soul is to act
according to the requirements of justice. But it is a justice of the laws
that are always subject to the review of love, in which the uniqueness
of none can be forgotten. A difficult universality..., 83

Let us, too, then, be among those who act now and henceforth to
receive all the children of Abraham and thereby perform our tikkun. In
this act, we enable our genuinely planetary dwelling.
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VI. Concluding Reflection
I conclude with a return to my opening remark that we are today on
that stretch of the road in our history whereupon European and nonEuropean alike are called to a reflection upon the matter of philosophical identity and the quest for planetary thinking. From the foregoing
survey it is clear that the non-European pursues a philosophical identity consistent with a particularized conception of "anthropological
essence." This is true for Asian, African, Latin American, and even that
diasporic phenomenon known as Israel that becomes assimilated to the
European in the modem "Jewish" state. We have here, in all these cases,
nothing other than signs of what Husserl and Heidegger both anticipated would likely occur in the transition beyond crisis. Husserl called it
the "Europeanization" of the non-European, even as the non-European
inevitably retains a "spiritual autonomy" expressed in a given
Weltanschauung philosophy. Heidegger called it the "broadening" of
Western history into world history by way of a diffusion of scientifictechnological rationality. Thus, in the encounter of civilizations, the
dynamic is less a "clash" (in the sense recently heralded by Samuel
Huntington) than it is a gradual movement of subsumption. The movement is one of hegemony, both epistemological and political.
This is hardly a trivial matter for the comparative study of civilizations, given that this field of study envisions epistemological and political possibilities of intercultural understanding, along the lines of what
I (following Hans-Georg Gadamer) take to be a "fusion of horizons." A
movement of subsumption, however, proceeds under the tutelage of a
vertical comportment that presupposes hierarchy in contrast to the reciprocity implicit in horizonal fusion.
Husserl and Heidegger understood that the technological rationality of the modem European philosophical project would carry with it an
institutionalized violence, consistent with European humanity's selfassertion of its "archontic" status. European concepts, European categories, European institutions—all would be diffused to the nonEuropean for an appropriation that tacitly expropriates and insidiously
decommissions
the local autonomy expressed as their ownmost
Weltanschauung philosophy (ethno-philosophy).
Thus, the debates between "ethnophilosophy" and "scientific" or
"theoretical" philosophy are already signs of Europe's hegemonic presence that is "quiescent" despite the empirical fact of postcoloniality in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Commitments to "anthropological
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essence" are signs of epistemological subsumption. Assertions of
"nationalism" and "liberation" qua "statism" in the developing world
are already signs of political subsumption according to the dictate of
modem subjectivism expressed collectively (the later Heidegger asserted as much). Even the discourse on "human rights" with its debate
between universalists and particularists discloses the hegemony of the
European legal order. In all these situations of intellectual engagement,
those who champion a "local identity" do not for the most part discern
their cooptation, thus a tacit constraint upon their authentic (eigentlich)
"emancipation."
In all the foregoing, the central fact is that all—Asian, African,
Latin American, Jew claim a right to philosophy and, thus, a right to
philosophical identity. Derrida observed recently that states that adhere
to the charters of international institutions (such as UNESCO) "commit
themselves, in principle, philosophically, to recognize and put into
operation in an effective way something like philosophy and a certain
philosophy of rights and law, the rights of man, universal history, etc." 84
But, here is a sign, a signatured commitment from the participants:
The signature of these charters is a philosophical act that makes a
commitment to philosophy in a way that is philosophical. From that
moment on, whether they say so or not, know it or not, or conduct
themselves accordingly or not, these states and peoples, by reason of
their joining (par leur adhesion) these charters or participating in
these institutions, contract a philosophical commitment—therefore, at
the very least, a commitment to provide the philosophical culture or
education that is required for understanding and putting into operation
these commitments made to the international institutions, which are,
I repeat, philosophical in essence. 85

Derrida's remarks here are relevant to the dynamic of civilizational encounter that visibly succumbs to European hegemony; for he holds
out the possibility that presents itself beyond this or that expression of
anthropological essence to which Asian, African, Latin American, and
post-Holocaust Jew are at present committed. As he says, "There are
other ways for philosophy than those of appropriation as expropriation
(to lose one's memory by assimilating the memory of the other, the one
being opposed to the other, as if an expropriation were not possible,
indeed the only possible chance)." 86
Derrida points to the fact that there is no single origin of philosophy, notwithstanding the dominance of the governing "semantic
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regime" that Europeanizes the other. My point is that the tension
between the origin that is "Athens" and the origin that is "Jerusalem"
keeps open the possibility of displacement of that "act of memory"
essential to any recursive discourse that deconstructs the Western tradition. To displace the act of memory that recurs to "Athens" is to invite
the act of memory that recurs to Jerusalem and so to enable a movement
in thought within another semantic regime. This possibility of displacement "beyond appropriation and expropriation" is precisely the possibility the non-European "philosopher" must engage as a necessary
interrogation of an ostensibly determined philosophical identity that is
actually, on the contrary, always to be kept in question.
Thus, given the reflection as I have carried it out heretofore, I cannot but leave the European philosopher, the African philosopher, the
Latin American philosopher, and the post-Holocaust Jewish philosopher
with an admonition. This admonition is decidedly proleptic and oblique
in its formulation, given that our time is transitional between points of
origin and the tension between semantic regimes. To assert as much, I
realize, is at the same time to inaugurate and to sustain a disputation
with those engaged in the comparative study of civilizations, and thus
to encourage and await multiple displacements. And so, now to admonish, I submit: To give utterance to a philosophical identity today is to do
violence to the advent of planetary thinking. It is the violence that issues
from a presumed warrant to defend the rights that are one's own—
European, Asian, African, Latin American, post-Holocaust Jew—while
being forgetful of the primacy of the rights of the other, which are properly always the first to be defended. It is this
epistemological/ontological/ethical/political/legal
component that invites all to that stature of
humanity that is "self-conscious," i.e., aware of and committed to performing limitless duties. Such is the promise of planetary thinking
beyond philosophical identity, a thinking that is itself a limitless duty in
the service of planetary dwelling.87
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